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Abstract  
To evaluate how undeclared work is being tackled in Croatia this paper reports an 
e-survey and in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in Croatia. It is revealed 
that, compared with the European Economic Area countries, Croatia has a weak 
institutional infrastructure for tackling undeclared work and pursues a narrower 
range of policy measures. The outcome is a call to develop a single body to better 
coordinate actions to tackle the undeclared economy in Croatia and for a shift 
towards an approach that seeks to provide gateways to formalisation. Furthermore, 
Croatia needs to modernise its work and welfare regime through higher levels 
of state expenditure in the labour market and social protection, coupled with 
redistribution via social transfers so as to construct a more equal society.
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Introduction
In order to provide a systematic overview of how the undeclared economy is being  tackled 
in Croatia in comparison to the European Economic Area (EEA) the following issues are 
addressed in this paper: the extent of undeclared work in Croatia and how it compares 
with the EEA; the institutional structures and policy approaches employed in Croatia 
for tackling undeclared work and how this compares with the EEA; the range of policy 
measures implemented in Croatia compared to those adopted in the EEA, and  exploring 
what should be done to improve the fight against undeclared work in this country. 
  Accordingly, the paper is organised so that the review of institutional structures, 
policy approaches and available measures for tackling the undeclared economy are 
presented first along with a discussion of those that have been implemented across 
the EEA. Following this, the second section is focused on the methodology employed 
to evaluate the institutional structures, policy approaches and measures adopted in 
Croatia, succeeded by the findings. Finally, a section synthesising the findings is 
presented including a discussion of the ways forward for Croatia with regard to what 
could be done to tackle the undeclared economy more effectively in this country. 
     Firstly, it is important to define what is understood by undeclared work. Although 
the phenomenon is variously denoted by 45 adjectives, including ‘informal’, ‘cash-in-
hand’, ‘underground’, ‘hidden’ and ‘shadow’ and 12 nouns such as work, employment 
and economy (Williams 2004; Nadin and Williams 2012), a firm consensus exists 
in terms of the type of activity that is to be included and excluded whilst discussing 
this form of work. The widely, though not officially, accepted definition within the 
European Union includes ‘productive activities that are lawful as regards their nature, 
but are not declared to the public authorities, taking into account the differences in 
their regulatory systems between Member States’ (European Commission 2007, p2). 
 Endeavours within the undeclared economy are on the fringes of the law and are there-
fore differentiated from criminal activities such as drug trafficking, people smuggling 
and money laundering. Furthermore, non-cash exchanges and subsistence production 
that is not exchanged is not encompassed by the term.
 
Settling the Scene: Tackling Undeclared Work in Europe
The focus on measuring the magnitude of undeclared work is widespread within 
the undeclared work literature. Consequently, the area has constructed copious 
estimates of the size of the undeclared economy using various indirect and direct 
measuring methods (Jutting and Laiglesia 2009; OECD 2002; Schneider 2011, 
2012; Schneider and Enste 2002; Thomas 1992; Williams 2004, 2006). The issue of 
tackling undeclared work has remained a marginal topic. Recently, however, it has 
attracted interest causing a small but growing body of literature to surface. Hence, 
a review of the available information, of how the fight against undeclared work is 
organised institutionally in Europe, and the policy approaches and measures used 
by European countries when tackling undeclared work, is presented in this section. 
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  Academics such as Feld and Larsen (2012) and Williams (2005) have written 
about the ways in which particular countries approach the undeclared economy 
and how they may come up with policies to increase the disincentives to people 
engaging in undeclared work. This work, however, falls short of a comparative 
analysis taking into account multi-nation cross-examination. Dekker et al. (2010), 
however, did just that, and evaluated at length the efforts of 31 European countries 
in their combat against undeclared work, and more specifically, the institutional 
organisation of those nations. Their findings showed that many nations (74%) did 
not have either a central committee or central agency responsible for the efforts 
to reduce undeclared work. (Germany and France with an agency and 6 countries 
including Italy, Slovenia and the Czech Republic with a central committee) The 
remainder of the studied countries were more-decentralised, either with the tax 
 offices taking the bulk of responsibility, as is the case in many Nordic countries, or 
the Labour Inspectorate, seen in other Eastern and Southern European countries. 
  Concerning the introduction and implementation of policy, there seem to be two 
distinct areas of focus. Countries may choose to either adopt an incentive scheme 
focused around the tax system, encouraging individuals into legitimate work as they 
are more highly rewarded for it (the enabling approach), or they may increase the 
disincentives of being found to be engaging in the undeclared economy. These two 
approaches are quite highly contrasted, with the latter increasing the search for workers 
or businesses failing to declare income, and then increasing penalties and punishments 
on these persons. Hasseldine and Li labelled (1999) this approach economic deter-
rence, compared with the tax method, which they labelled as ‘fiscal psychology’; to 
put it more simply, ‘the Stick vs. the Carrot’ (Small Business Council, 2004).
  Table 1 provides a summary of the methods and measures used by these two 
 contrasting approaches. The deterrence principle focuses on an individual behaving 
as a rational being, somebody who weighs up the pros and cons of a decision before 
 choosing which option to go for (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Individuals will  assign 
an ‘is it worth it’ weighting to disincentives such as a criminal record, or a prison sen-
tence, as well as obvious weightings such as a cash fine. Their chances of being caught 
will also be taken into account, therefore to increase deterrence individuals must realise 
that there is a much higher chance of being found to be engaging in undeclared work, 
whereas if there is absolutely no chance of being caught, many more would practice 
the behaviour. On the alternative side, individual, rational economic actors will think 
of the legitimate, declared side of the economy as more positive if the fiscal policy is 
more accommodating. For example increasing the VAT threshold may see business 
owners declaring more of their earnings. As Allingham and Sandmo (1972) describe 
it, policy makers should impose a ‘negative reinforcement approach’, making sure 
that everyone knows that the illegal behaviour will be caught and punished severely. 
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 On the other hand, academic research into the approaches of policy makers to 
undeclared work has led to an increase in backing for the enabling method. Kagan 
and Scholz (1984) believe that viewing the public as ‘social actors’ is a more realistic 
approach. They believe that people, by their nature, will comply with the law and those 
that don’t have been forced out of doing so by the tax system. Murphy (2005) offers 
the hypothesis that the tax authorities should be ‘enablers’, who offer the appropriate 
incentives to individuals who wish to declare earnings. The European Commission 
(2007) backs this motivation as does the Small Business Council (2004). In the long 
term individuals will seek to maximise their utility by following laws and engaging 
in legal activity as much as they can. 
Table 1. Policy approaches towards undeclared work
 Source: derived from Williams and Renooy (2009)
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 Governments have a choice of three methods when aiming to achieve a  reduction 
in the levels of undeclared work. The first is a fiscal system which encourages 
people to behave legally from the beginning, Williams and Renooy (2008)  suggest 
that this will stop the need for individuals to stray from the declared economy. 
 Another approach is to incentivise a switch from not declaring earnings to declaring 
them, amnesties for those wishing to switch, for example. A third option is the soft 
policy approach, such as redistributional justice, or education on tax immorality. 
  Williams and Renooy, in a 2009 paper, explained that the deterrence approach 
was still the most popular policy choice in 2001, and that the first approach,  focusing 
on a fair and engaging tax system, was rarely used across Europe. This bias towards 
the deterrence approach continued throughout the early part of the decade;  however, 
by 2005, more member states were committing to enabling approaches. Tax  systems 
began to focus more on the preventing of individuals engaging in undeclared work 
while the softer, educational approaches, encouraging people to look at tax  morality, 
were lacking. Indeed, beyond the 15 original states of the EU, the deterrence 
method was still a hugely popular and dominant policy. In cases where an enabling 
approach was adopted, it was confined mostly to preventive methods as softer 
measures engendering higher commitment to tax morality remained largely absent. 
  To find out whether a wider range of approaches and methods were being used, 
Dekker et al. (2010) surveyed senior officials involved in the fight against undeclared 
work from either labour inspectorates, tax offices, social security administrations, 
trade unions, employer representative organisations and other relevant agencies 
such as customs, border police and immigration in the 31 countries of the European 
Economic Area (EEA). Ranking the four approaches from most important to least 
important in their country, 57 per cent stated that the deterrence approach was the 
most important in their country and only 43 per cent considered the enabling approach 
as the most important. On the other hand, when asked to order the approaches from 
the least important, 84 per cent declared enabling approaches and merely 16 per cent 
the deterrence approach. This clarifies that whilst there is a continuing shift towards 
adopting enabling approaches, the majority of member states remain entrenched in a 
deterrence approach that pursues the eradication of undeclared work.
 Although in 2010 all 31 EEA countries were continuing to use deterrence methods 
it is evident that there has been an increase in the range of methods and measures being 
adopted since the onset of the recession. This is shown through a greater  implementation 
of preventative, curative and commitment methods than in the period preceding the 
recession. By 2010, 90 per cent of European Economic Area (EEA) countries used 
one or more preventative policy measures, 64 per cent of countries adopted one or 
more curative measures and 69 per cent had implemented commitment measures 
(Dekker et al., 2010). Therefore, it is clear that although the deterrence approach is 
still widely used, the enabling approach has started to be more broadly introduced. 
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 Thus far, however, there have been no evaluations of either how the fight against 
undeclared work is organised institutionally or the policy approaches and measures 
that are being used in Croatia. The current paper seeks to fill this gap.
 
Methods
In order to identify the policy approaches and measures adopted in Croatia, as well as 
to identify how the fight against undeclared work is being organised more generally, we 
first carried out a comprehensive literature review including academic,  governmental 
and social partners’ statistical sources. This involved a review of surveys of  undeclared 
work in Croatia, a desk-based survey of the institutional structures employed to fight 
undeclared work in Croatia encompassing both published and ‘grey’ literature and 
a desk-based survey of policy measures. This, however, resulted in large gaps in 
knowledge of both the organisation of the fight against the undeclared economy and 
the policy approaches and measures being implemented.
 In order to fill the gaps in understanding as well as to provide up-to-date  information 
and further detail an e-survey was conducted [see Appendix 1] gathering data from 
key stakeholders.
 Based on Dekker et al.’s (2010) survey instrument used to study EEA countries 
the information sought was: the characteristics of the current national institutional 
 framework in Croatia; the existing policy measures used; their perceptions of the 
 importance of each policy measure in the overall approach adopted; their perceived best 
practices in this field, and the usefulness of various possible policy options. A total of 
some 9 responses were obtained from senior stakeholders. The participants were chosen 
by contacting relevant institutions and asking for knowledgeable  representatives to 
 participate. Although there are limitations with such a number of responses the key aim 
was to get representatives from government departments involved in the fight against 
undeclared labour, as well as social partners such as employer’s associations and expert 
academics. Additionally we obtained the responses of a World Bank economist.
 Subsequent to the web survey three in-depth semi-structured interviews were  carried 
out with a sample of the stakeholders who were asked to comment on the  results of the 
e-survey and to provide any additional information they had with regard to the country’s 
fight against undeclared work. This was done in order to obtain  additional information 
to satisfy any gaps or disparities on existing national institutional frameworks and 
policy measures adopted in Croatia as well as to seek richer in-depth understanding of 
the effectiveness and importance of the various approaches being implemented. The 
 respondents were asked to comment on each policy approach that had been outlined 
as present (from the e-survey) in Croatia’s fight against undeclared work.
 Finally, in order to validate our findings, a workshop was undertaken in November 
2012 in Zagreb with experts and representatives of key stakeholders involved in the 
fight against undeclared work in Croatia. The results from the study are reported below.
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Findings
To contextualise the findings a brief outline of the extent and nature of the undeclared 
economy in Croatia is provided, followed by the results of the organisation of the fight 
against undeclared work in Croatia relative to other EEA countries and an evaluation 
of the adopted policy approaches and measures, along with broader findings that reveal 
the size of the undeclared economy to be indivisibly connected to the type of work 
and welfare that prevails in a country. This provides the necessary material to yield 
some conclusions of what needs to be done to more effectively tackle the undeclared 
economy in Croatia. 
Extent and nature of the undeclared economy in Croatia
With a population of 4,430,003, Croatia is defined by the World Bank as a ‘high income’ 
country with a GNI per capita of US$13,760 (World Bank Doing Business Survey, 
2012). In September 2012, the monthly minimum wage was 2,814 kuna, the average 
gross monthly earnings/person in paid employment was 7,958 kuna and monthly net 
earnings/person in paid employment was 5,499 kuna. The registered unemployment 
rate in October 2012 was 19.61% (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2012).
Extent of undeclared work
In Croatia, as in other countries, many different estimates of the size of the undeclared 
economy exist, each using different measurement methods. It is important, therefore, 
to be aware of the measurement method underpinning any estimate. Table 2 reports 
the findings of the World Bank Enterprise Survey 2007, which interviewed 633 firm 
owners, and uses the same questions across many countries. This reveals that 98.1% 
of the firms surveyed reported that they were formally registered when they started 
operations and the 1.9% of firms that were not registered operated on average for just 
1.1 years without formal registration. Nevertheless, evidence that many formal and 
informal businesses operate on an undeclared basis is provided by the fact that 31.7% 
of firms report that they compete against unregistered or informal firms and 25% report 
that the practices of informal sector competitors are a major constraint on their business.
 A further measure of the extent of the undeclared economy is provided by Schneider 
(2011), who measures its size as a proportion of GDP using his Multiple Indicators Mul-
tiple Causes (MIMIC) method1. Figure 1 compares the size of the undeclared economy 
in Croatia with its EU-27 counterparts. It reveals that the undeclared economy in Croatia 
1. As with the MIMIC estimation procedure one obtains only relative values, with the help of the 
currency demand approach, for a few countries (Austria, Germany, Poland and Switzerland). 
These values have been calibrated into absolute ones.
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is equivalent to 30.4% of GDP and as such, is larger than in all EU-27  member states 
with the exception of Bulgaria. However, other researchers, such as Klaric (2011), 
dispute such high figures of undeclared work within Croatia. Klaric (2011), using the 
MIMIC method, finds that in 2009 the annual undeclared work income relative to the 
official GDP was 4.18%. However, for the current paper the limitation of Klaric’s 
method lies in this statistic not being compared with that of other countries. 
Table 2. Magnitude of Undeclared Work in Croatia
 Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2007
 
Examining the trends over time in the magnitude of the undeclared economy,  Schneider 
(2011: 42) finds that it has slightly reduced in size from 33.8% of GDP in 1999, through 
32.1% in 2003 to 30.4% in 2007.
 Care, however, needs to be taken with such estimations of the size of the 
 undeclared economy that result from indirect measurement methods. Using proxy 
indicators and/or seeking statistical traces of undeclared work in data collected 
for other purposes, there are often marked variations in the estimates of its size. 
As the Institute for Market Economics (2002) shows, summarised in Table 3, at 
any one time different methods can produce different estimates of the size of the 
 undeclared economy as well as different views of its trajectory. For example, while 
the approach which seeks discrepancies in the national accounts (Madzarevic 
and Mikulic, 2001) reveals a sharp decline in the size of the undeclared economy 
 between 1995 and 2000, monetary methods show a slight increase over the same 
period, as does the electricity consumption approach (Sosic and Faulend, 2001). 
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Table 3. Estimate of the Size of the ‘Undeclared Economy’ 1990-2000: % of GDP
 Source: Institute for Market Economics (2002)
Nature of undeclared work
Various surveys highlight how the undeclared economy is concentrated in some 
 sectors of the economy more than others (Bicanic and Ott, 1997; Institute for Market 
 Economics, 2002; Mikulic and Madzarevic, 2001). Comparing the undeclared economy 
in agriculture, industry and trade over the period 1990-1999, Bicanic and Ott (1997) 
note that while the undeclared economy in agriculture was somewhere between 6.8-16.9 
per cent of GDP between 1990-1999, in industry it was rather lower, ranging from 2.3 
per cent in 1996 to 5.2 per cent in 1998. In trade, meanwhile, the undeclared economy 
was far more prevalent although the trends over time in its relative size were identical 
to industry, with a sudden growth in the undeclared economy in retailing during the 
1990-1993 period (to almost 60 per cent of trade as a whole), followed by a sudden fall 
in 1993-1994 (to around 35 per cent) and then a mild decline or stagnation from 1995 
until 1999. Overall between 1990 and 1999, undeclared work was reducing in trade 
and stagnating in agriculture, but rising in industry. Their argument is that the process 
of transition into a market economy was variable across sectors, with the transition 
being most rapid in trade and slowest in industry. Although many studies have been 
carried out more recently to estimate the size and extent of the informal economy in 
Croatia, there is a lack of research investigating its nature. 
 Svec (2009) finds that the labour activity rate is inversely proportional to the estimate 
of people unemployed in the undeclared economy. In Croatia, therefore, as the activity 
rate falls, the undeclared employment grows. This suggests that the population switches 
between the formal and informal economy. However, in order to make further  conclusions 
as to why this happens we would need more qualitative data investigating the issue. 
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   To evaluate the distribution of the undeclared economy across sectors in Croatia 
in a manner that is comparable cross-nationally, the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
can be analysed. In 2007, and as Table 4 reveals, businesses in the food sector (i.e., 
agriculture and allied industries) were most likely to witness competition from 
 unregistered or informal firms, followed by manufacturing and retailing. Examining 
whether the activities of informal or unregistered businesses were a major constraint 
on formal businesses, meanwhile, the finding is that this was most widely felt in the 
food sector, followed by other services and then the garment industry. Although retail 
businesses witnessed competition from undeclared enterprises, therefore, they did 
not perceive these undeclared competitors as a major constraint on their operations. 
Table 4. Prevalence of the Undeclared Economy in Croatia: by Sector, Firm Size, 
Location, Exporting Status and Ownership
 
 Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2007
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Socio-economic, business and spatial variations
Table 4 also reveals that large firms appear to be less affected by the existence of 
 unregistered or informal businesses than smaller and medium sized businesses. While 
one-third of SMEs assert that they compete against informal or unregistered firms, 
only one-fifth of large firms assert that this is the case. Indeed, small businesses are 
far more likely than medium or large businesses to assert that informal or unregistered 
businesses are a major constraint. Related to this, it is non-exporting businesses and 
domestically-owned businesses who are more likely to witness competition from 
 informal or unregistered businesses, and who are more likely to state that the  undeclared 
economy constrains their business than exporting and foreign-owned businesses.
 There are also significant spatial variations in the prevalence of the undeclared 
economy. While 53 per cent of businesses in Zagreb state that they compete against 
unregistered or informal businesses, 41.2 per cent in the North and 40.8 per cent in 
Slavonjia, this figure is just 25.6 per cent in Lika and Banovina, 17 per cent in  Dalmacija 
and 12.3 per cent in Istra and Hrvatsko Primorje.
Types of undeclared work
No known contemporary studies have sought to evaluate the prevalence of different 
types of undeclared work in Croatia. For example, it is not known what proportions of 
the undeclared economy is composed of ‘envelope wages’, waged informal employ-
ment, informal self-employment and paid favours. This will require investigation in 
future studies. One way to achieve this would be to replicate the 2007 Eurobarometer 
survey that covered the EU-27 in Croatia (European Commission, 2007b).
Barriers to formalisation
The annual World Bank Doing Business surveys provide one of the few data sources on 
the barriers to formalisation in Croatia. These provide data (which is cross-nationally 
comparable, given that the survey is annually conducted in 183 countries) on how easy 
or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business 
when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in  regulations 
affecting 10 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business,  dealing with 
 construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit,  protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving 
 insolvency. Consequently, the survey allows an understanding of the broader business 
environment and assesses a particular set of issues that aid the explanation of  undeclared 
activity, thereby giving policy makers an insight into potential areas of reform. 
Examining quantitative estimates of the ease of doing business in each of these ten 
areas and comparing the findings with 183 other countries, the finding is that, overall, 
Croatia was ranked 80th out of 183 in 2012 in terms of the ease of doing business (the 
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EU-27 overall as a composite would be ranked 38th) and 79th in 2011. The implication 
is that it is more difficult to open and run a small business in Croatia than in the EU-
27 as a composite, although Croatia does perform better on some aspects than others 
relative to other countries. 
 Take, for example, starting a business. Evaluating how easy it is to start a business, 
Croatia is ranked 67th out of 183 countries, whilst the EU-27 as a composite would be 
ranked 66th.  Starting a business in Croatia requires 6 procedures, takes 7 days, costs 8.6 
per cent of income per capita and requires paid-in minimum capital of 13.8 per cent of 
income per capita. In part, this was because in 2011, Croatia has made it easier to start 
a business by allowing limited liability companies to file their registration application 
with the court registries electronically through the public notary (World Bank Doing 
Business Report Croatia 2012).
 Examining the ease of paying taxes, meanwhile, Croatia stands at 32nd in the  ranking 
of 183 economies, whilst the EU-27 as a composite is 71st, suggesting that paying 
taxes is easier in Croatia than the EU-27 as a whole. On average, firms make 17 tax 
 payments a year, spend 196 hours a year filing, preparing and paying taxes and pay total 
taxes amounting to 11.5% of profit. Although the World Bank Doing Business Survey 
states that no reforms have occurred in the 2010 to 2012 period, this is not the case. In 
2009, the standard VAT rate in Croatia was increased from 22% to 23% and a ‘crisis 
tax’ was introduced, levied on the net income of households and the abolition of all 
tax relief in the personal income system. This had a negative impact in citizens’ minds 
on operating formally but by November 2010 the crisis tax was revoked.  Furthermore 
the government changed the law on personal income tax, decreasing the tax brackets 
from four to three, reducing the lowest tax rate (from 15 per cent to 12 per cent). This 
was done in order to lower the tax burden for the employed.
 Comparing Croatia with the EU-27, moreover, Grdoviζ Gnip and Tomiζ (2010) show 
that Croatia has a higher tax burden and a higher employment protection legislation 
index. They also point out that the greatest impact of the overall tax burden falls on 
Croatian workers in the lower income brackets. Therefore, although the  government 
has started to take some action to reduce the tax burden in an attempt to make 
 formalisation easier, this is perhaps an area for further improvement in Croatia, despite 
its  apparently higher ranking than the EU-27 in the World Bank Doing Business surveys. 
The aforementioned surveys are, however, limited in scope with regard to measuring 
barriers to formalisation and therefore more studies should be carried out in Croatia 
that seek to investigate the nature of such barriers and obtain a broader perspective 
on policy challenges.
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Organisation of the fight against undeclared work
Analysing how the fight against undeclared work is organised in 31 European countries, 
Dekker et al. (2010) find that in eight countries (26%) there is either a single agency 
responsible for the fight against undeclared work or a central coordinating committee 
responsible for ensuring coordinated action by the multifarious departments who have 
a stake in tackling undeclared work.  This is not true of Croatia, which does not have 
a single agency or coordinating committee responsible for ensuring joined-up action 
by the array of departments involved in tackling undeclared work.  Furthermore, there 
is no lead department responsible for tackling undeclared work. 
 In Croatia, different governmental organisations are responsible for different 
aspects, including the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour and Pension System, 
State Inspectorate, Tax Administration, Croatian Employment Service, Ministry of 
Tourism, Ministry of Agriculture and Customs Administration. These government 
departments largely have their own separate targets for undeclared work. From the 
interviews conducted it was found that the responsibilities of each department were 
not clearly defined over the long term but varied with projects. 
 Despite responsibility for tackling undeclared work being distributed across 
 numerous departments and the targets pursued being largely department-based 
rather than shared, there are individual examples of where operational cooperation 
and  coordination occurs, such as joint inspection visits. It was also found from our 
 e-survey and interviews that data sharing across departments has been improved 
since the introduction of individual identification numbers for citizens. Furthermore, 
 occasionally objectives and projects run across departments and shared plans and goals 
are adopted. This is exemplified with the shared goal of informing the public of the 
pitfalls of undeclared work and the benefits of formalising.
  
The role of social partners
It is important to emphasise the crucial role that social partners can play with regard to 
fighting undeclared work. They are often instrumental with preventative action such as 
information campaigns or initiatives to improve education and training. Furthermore, 
they have an important part to play in implementing social legislation as well as aiding 
the monitoring carried out by relevant authorities. 
 In Croatia the involvement of social partners occurs through the Economic and 
Social Council (ESC), established in 1994 to enable tripartite social dialogue between 
the government, employers and trade unions. To further improve this, the Office for 
Social Partnership was introduced in 2001. The ESC has had a different number of 
working bodies over the years. Currently, since the new Agreement on establishing 
the ESC was signed in February 2012, the ESC has 5 permanent working bodies – the 
Committees. The union associations that participate are the Union of Autonomous Trade 
Unions of Croatia (SSSH), the Independent Croatian Trade Unions (NHS), the Croatian 
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Trade Union Association (HUS), the Association of Workers’ Trade Unions of Croatia 
(URSH) and the Association of Croatian Trade Unions (Matica). Although there are 
more than 500 registered trade unions in Croatia, these five major  associations cover 
approximately 90 per cent of trade union membership in the country. The dominant 
employers’ organisation is the Croatian Employers’ Association (HUP), established 
in 1993.
 Despite the establishment of this formal institutional arrangement in the form of 
the ESC and the Office of Social Partnership, there remains a relatively weak culture 
of social dialogue (Milicevic - Pezelj, A., 2011). As Šokčević (2009: 322) states, there 
exists “a deep division in values and interests between actors of collective bargaining”. 
This is exemplified by the trade unions withdrawing from the ESC in 2010 for six 
months in protest at the weak dialogue. The reason was that there was no real dialogue. 
In their opinion, they were given a short time to study the materials sent out by state 
bodies and they were not satisfied with the voting procedures. However, new Rules 
of Procedure have been adopted to ensure restoration of the work of the ESC in the 
sense that there is no longer voting on each item on the agenda. When situations arise 
where consensus is not reached, social partners are able to state their disagreement 
which will then be published on the website of the Independent Service for Social 
Partnership.
 
Policy approach and measures
As has been mentioned and displayed in table 5, despite the call by the European 
Commission to transform undeclared work into declared employment, most countries 
remain entrenched in a repressive approach that seeks to stamp out undeclared work. 
The view that undeclared work needs to be transferred into the declared realm is far 
from being widely accepted.
Table 5. Stakeholder Opinion of the Relative Importance Accorded to Different Types 
of Policy Measure in their Country
 Source: Dekker et al (2010)
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 This is similarly the case in the 5 EU Candidate Countries (CC5). Indeed, in the 
CC5, the widespread view is that repression measures are accorded the greater im-
portance in their country when tackling undeclared work. This is similarly the case in 
Croatia. Interviews with government officials and social partners strongly confirm that 
deterrence remains the dominant policy approach, although there is a recognition that 
a much wider range of measures are being introduced over time, even if they are not 
yet accorded the same importance as deterrence in the fight against undeclared work.
 Is it the case, therefore, that measures are being pursued in Croatia similar to those 
of the EEA countries? As Table 6 displays, all 31 EEA countries were continuing to 
use repressive measures aimed at stamping out undeclared work, with all seeking to 
improve detection and 93% using penalties and/or sanctions. However, they are also 
pursuing measures to change the ‘benefits’ side of the equation by making it easier 
and more beneficial to operate in the declared economy, as called for by the  European 
Commission; 90% adopt one or more preventative policy measure, although the range 
of measures used is relatively narrow beyond simplifying compliance, and 64% use 
one or more curative measures, although again the range used is narrow beyond 
the use of targeted direct tax incentives (e.g., income tax relief/reduction/subsidy 
schemes). Moreover, there has been recognition of the need to shift from purely the 
‘harder’ policy approach which changes the cost/benefit ratio confronting suppliers and 
 purchasers and towards a ‘softer’ approach that seeks to move away from  compliance 
and towards engendering a commitment to tax morality; 69% of the 31 countries adopt 
some  commitment measure.
 Comparing the range of measures used in Croatia with the EEA, Table 6 reveals 
that a full range of deterrence measures are similarly used. Although enabling measures 
are also starting to be used, until now it has been largely preventative measures that 
have been adopted. Curative measures that seek to transform undeclared work into 
declared work are particularly scarce compared with the EEA whilst policies aimed at 
fostering commitment to declared work, although introduced, are quite recent measures 
and their impact is not yet known. 
 Over the past few years, one of the priorities of the Croatian government has 
been to update the laws and clarify the conditions that businesses and persons must 
meet to be fully legal. Steps have been taken to improve labour relations within a 
stronger  regulatory framework (World Trade Organisation, 2010).  It was found from 
our  interviews and the validation workshop that the majority of updates to the laws, 
 however, have adopted a deterrence focus, signalling the continuing prominence given 
to the repressive approach. For example, the powers of government inspectors have 
been expanded and inspections are increasing annually as well as intensified during 
seasons of increased working (e.g. summer in the region of Dalmacija). A  coordination 
of  various  inspection bodies in this regard has been introduced to ensure greater 
 efficiency.
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 Table 6. Policy measures used in Croatia and the EEA to tackle undeclared work
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Nevertheless, the use of enabling measures has also increased in recent years. Akin to 
other EU-27 member states, incentives have been introduced to help the  unemployed 
move into self-employment, although certain sectors are excluded - such as the 
 hospitality industry. These provide 12 month grants ranging from €2,500 for crafts 
people to €3,250 for traders (Hrvatski Zavod za Zaposljavanje, 2012).    
 Akin to many other EEA countries, a voucher system has also been introduced. In 
Croatia, this has been in the agricultural sector. No evaluations have yet been conducted 
but if successful, the intention is to extend it to tourism, household services and other 
seasonal activities. This provides employees with a daily voucher for each recorded day 
of work and provides employers with incentives for declaring seasonal work. Under 
the previous law, social contributions had to be paid for the entire month even if the 
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weather allows the seasonal employee only five days of working. Workers must receive 
a minimum daily wage of 70.40 HRK (€9.40) and work no longer than a maximum of 
12 hours per day. A seasonal worker can be employed for 90 days per calendar year.
The penalties for violating the provisions of the act are up to 50,000HRK for legal 
persons and 10,000-30,000HRK for individuals (Hrvatski Zavod za Zaposljavanje, 
2012). The law is simple and clear, and the process is limited in administration.
 There has also been a simplification of business registration procedures akin to the 
‘one stop shop’ principle used in many other EEA countries. The HITRO.HR business 
 registration service enables citizens and entrepreneurs to have quicker and simpler access 
to information and services in one location. As part of this initiative, a multifunctional 
smart card (FINA e-card) has been introduced and is intended for electronic business, 
simplifying and speeding up business processes and eliminating unnecessary paperwork. 
The e-card therefore saves time and money for businesses willing to operate electronically. 
  Promoting a culture of commitment to tax morality has also been pursued,  using 
campaigns in daily newspapers, on television, the internet and other media. The 
 intention is to clarify certain procedures, new laws and policies and show that working 
on an undeclared basis is not profitable.
 In sum, although Croatia gives prominence to deterrence measures, it is also paying 
greater attention to enabling policy measures. Until now, however, this has been mostly 
in the realm of preventative measures. The use of supply-side curative measures has 
been very limited, whilst the adoption of ‘softer’ commitment measures to improve 
citizens’ tax morality has been recent. The lesson for Croatia, therefore, is that there 
needs to be greater attention paid to curative and commitment policy measures that 
seek to transform undeclared work into declared work. 
Undeclared economies and work/welfare regimes
Changes beyond the realm of direct policy measures are needed in order for undeclared 
work to be tackled. As is outlined below there is evidence that the broader work and 
welfare regimes also affect the size of the undeclared economy in a country.  
  It is evident that thus far two opposing perspectives have prevailed. A neo-liberal 
perspective would in this case argue that undeclared economies are a direct  consequence 
of high taxes, over-regulation and state intervention in the free market therefore 
 advocating for countries to engage in de-regulation, tax reductions and minimal state 
interference. Alternatively, if considered from the perspective of social democracy, it 
is under-regulation that propels the undeclared economy and the solution is therefore 
state intervention and higher levels of social protection (Vorley and Williams, 2012).
 To evaluate these rival perspectives, five indicators can be analysed that compare 
the impacts on the size of the undeclared economy of the more interventionist ‘welfare 
capitalist’ approach and less interventionist ‘neo-liberal’ approach. These are the level 
of implicit tax rates on labour income (Eurostat, 2007, 2011), state expenditure on 
interventions in the labour market as a proportion of GDP (Eurostat, 2011), the level 
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of state social protection expenditure (excluding old age benefits) as a proportion 
of GDP (European Commission, 2011), the effectiveness of state redistribution via 
social transfers (European Commission, 2011) and the level of intra-national equality 
in the society, as measured by the gini-coefficient (European Commission, 2011). For 
further explanation and details of data-sets and methodology, see Williams (2012a,b) 
and Vorley and Williams (2012).
 As Table 7 reveals, there is no statistically significant correlation between the 
 implicit tax rates on labour (i.e., the average effective tax burden on labour income) 
and the size of undeclared economies. Using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
(rs) due to the non-parametric nature of the data, no statistically significant  correlation 
is found between the size of the undeclared economy across the EU-27 and the im-
plicit tax rates on labour (rs=-0.266). Indeed, merely 10.2 percent of the variance in 
the size of the underground economy is correlated with the variance in implicit tax 
rates (R2=0.1019). However, there is a statistically significant correlation between 
the size of undeclared economies and the level of state expenditure on labour market 
 interventions, expenditure levels on social protection, the level of state redistribution 
via social transfers, and the degree to which societies are equal. In summary, the finding 
is that welfare regimes where there is greater labour market intervention, higher levels 
of social protection and redistribution via social transfers, and there is greater equality, 
tend to have smaller undeclared economies. This could have significant implications 
for Croatia. It tentatively suggests that undeclared economies will be reduced not only 
by pursuing targeted policy measures but also by modernising its work and welfare 
regime through higher levels of expenditure on state intervention in the labour market 
and social protection, coupled with redistribution via social transfers so as to construct 
more equal societies.
   
Table 7. Bivariate regressions of relationship between size of undeclared economy 
and work and welfare regimes
 Data: Eurostat and European Commission publications, based on the analysis of the situation 
in the EU27
 Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
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Conclusions
In this paper a systematic overview of the extent and nature of undeclared work, and 
how it is being tackled, in the EU Candidate country of Croatia has been presented. 
The objectives encompassed within this have been to analyse: the scale and nature of 
undeclared work in Croatia, how the fight against the undeclared economy is organised 
and the policy approaches and measures being adopted.  
 Throughout the paper, a comparison of Croatia with the EU-27 is made but is done 
so bearing in mind the intricate nature of undeclared work and differences among 
countries. A call, therefore, is made for more in-depth research to be carried out within 
the context of Croatia, as taking into consideration that the undeclared economy is 
affected by the wider contextual environment creates a more holistic and intricate 
picture and therefore more appropriate policy recommendations. 
 The finding is that the undeclared economy in Croatia is equivalent to 30.4% of GDP 
and as such, is larger than in all EU-27 member states with the exception of Bulgaria. 
Nor is the undeclared economy evenly distributed in Croatia. It is most concentrated 
in agriculture and allied trades, followed by manufacturing and  retailing. Large firms, 
and exporting and foreign-owned businesses, furthermore, are less affected by informal 
businesses and less likely to view them as a major constraint, than smaller and  medium 
sized businesses, non-exporting and domestically-owned businesses. At present, 
 nevertheless, it is not possible to compare who does undeclared work in Croatia, what 
types of work they do and for what reasons with other EU-27 member states. One way 
forward, therefore, might be the implementation of the 2007 Eurobarometer survey 
and/or the inclusion of the CC5 in any future second wave Eurobarometer survey, so 
as to enable a comparison of the nature of undeclared work in Croatia with the EU-27. 
 Turning to how the fight against undeclared work is organised in Croatia, there is 
no one single compliance unit/agency/organisation responsible for tackling undeclared 
work. Nor is there even a government department that takes lead responsibility. Instead, 
different governmental organisations take responsibility for different facets, including 
the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour and Pension System, State Inspectorate, 
Tax Administration, Croatian Employment Service, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Customs Administration. On the whole, these departments do not have 
common or shared targets with regard to tackling undeclared work, and the pursuit of a 
joined-up approach is in its infancy so far as strategy is concerned, although there are 
limited examples of joining-up operations and data sharing on a cross-departmental 
basis. Furthermore, although formal institutional arrangements and a framework exist 
for the involvement of social partners, including the Economic and Social Council 
(ESC) and the Autonomous Service for Social Partnership, the culture of social  dialogue 
remains relatively weak.
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 Finally, and similar to the EEA countries, Croatia has given prominence to the 
 repressive approach towards undeclared work, seeking to stamp it out. Although 
 enabling measures are starting to be used in Croatia, especially preventative meas-
ures, there is little use of curative measures, especially incentives to encourage those 
working undeclared to formalise, and measures to foster commitment to tax morality 
are fairly recent. The lesson, therefore, is that Croatia needs to pay greater attention 
to curative and commitment policy measures that seek to transform undeclared work 
into declared work. Besides such direct policy interventions, this report also provides 
evidence of a strong correlation between countries in which there is greater labour 
market intervention, social protection, redistribution and equality, and smaller unde-
clared economies. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the findings from this paper will 
help Croatia in its fight against undeclared work. If it does so, it will have fulfilled its 
objective. 
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